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A PARADOX OF OUR NATIONAL
LABOR LAW
WILLIAM G. RIcE:, JR.*
The goal of collective bargaining is to stabilize, or govern, the
relation between an employer (or group of employers) and all his
(or their) employees in a bargaining unit through standards and rules
jointly evolved by the representatives of the parties and usually to
some degree jointly administered. This is most explicitly stated in the
Railway Labor Act in defining general purposes and general duties:"
particularly, "It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents,
and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and
to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such
agreements or otherwise."2 The Supreme Court found the same mean-
ing in the National Labor Relations Act,3 since "the House Committee
recommended the legislation as 'an amplification and clarification of
the principles enacted into law by the Railway Labor Act,'" and
added that the employer's obligation includes, upon demand of the
other party, signing a written statement of any agreement reached.4
This obligation the Taft-Hartley revision of the N.L.R.A. expressly
imposes on both parties.5
But what is the legal consequence of breaking such contracts once
made? Whatever the remedy before 1947, another section of the
Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act opens the national
courts to suits for their violation,6 thus emphasizing their basic signifi-
*A.B., A.M., LL.B., S.J.D., Harvard University; Professor of Law, University
of Wisconsin Law School.
I Railway Labor Act §2, 8 U.S.C. §151a, §152.
2 R.L.A. §2 First (1926 and 1934), 8 U.S.C. §152 first.
3 N.L.R.A. (1935) §8(5). Where the N.L.R.A. is cited without date the part
cited is the same in the Wagner Act (1935) and the Taft-Hartley Act (1947).
The 1935 text appears in 29 U.S.C. §151-§166 (1947) and the 1947 text in
the pocket supplement §151-§167. Since the numbering of the sections of the
Act and that of the U.S.C. sections correspond, only the former is used here-
inafter.
4 H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
5 Each party is "to bargain collectively" upon demand of the other, N.L.R.A.
(1947) §8(b) (3), which is defined to mean "performance . . . of mutual
obligation . . . to .. .confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment... and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party,"
N.L.R.A. (1947) §8 (d).6 Labor Management Relations Act (1947) §301(a), 29 U.S.C. §185(a), which
"was not enacted merely to provide a new forum for the enforcement of
contracts theretofore enforceable solely in the state courts . . .but . . . was
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cance in labor relations. The majority report of the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare 7 explained the responsibilities created
by the bill it reported. A provision giving the N.L.R.B. authority to
hear charges of breach of contract and presumably to redress such
breaches by specific order, which was later removed from the bill,
was said by the Committee to be "not sufficient .... We feel that the
aggrieved party should also have a right of action in the federal courts."
In the United States courts, says this committee report, however, "The
Norris-LaGuardia Acts has insulated labor unions, in the field of in-
junctions,9 against liability for breach of contract," and many state
courts are limited by laws of like tenor. Turning to the law of financial
liability of associations, the report continues: "It has been argued that
the result of making collective agreements enforceable against unions
would be that they would no longer consent to the inclusion of a no-
strike clause in a contract." But the committee thought this result
was not evident in the four states 0 that had enacted laws "to secure
designed to protect interstate and foreign commerce by creating a new sub-
stantive liability actionable in the federal courts." Schatte v. Theatrical Stage
Employees, 182 F. (2d) 158 (9th cir., 1950), denying redress for a breach
occurring before the Act was in effect.
7 S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. (1947) on S. 1126. This is the only Committee
report discussing more than superficially the contract-enforcement provision.
Briefly stated positions, pro and contra, on the provision of the similar House
bill (H.R. 3020) are found in the majority and minority views expressed in
H. Rep. 245.
8 Act of March 23, 1932, 47 Stat. c. 90, 29 U.S.C. §101-§115. Since the number-
ing of the fifteen sections of the Act and that of the U.S.C. sections corres-
pond, only the former is used hereinafter.
9 The most drastic provisions almost completely free picketing from judicial
restraint, but the law as a whole applies more broadly.
10 The states-California, Colorado, Minnesota, and Wisconsin-are named, but
the acts are not identified. Probably the provisions are these: (1) Calif.
Labor Code §1126 (enacted 1941 and still in effect: "Any collective bargaining
agreement between an employer and a labor organization shall be enforceable
at law and in equity, and a breach ... shall be subject to the same remedies,
including injunctive relief, as are available on other contracts .... " (2) Colo.
Stat. Ann. c. 97 (enacted 1943 and still in effect) §94(6): "(1) It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer individually or in concert with others:...
To violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement .... (2) It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with
others: ... (c) To violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. .. "
By §94(8) (4), final orders (of the State Industrial Commission) in an un-
fair labor practice proceeding may "require the person complained of to
cease and desist from the unfair labor practices found to have been com-
mitted. ." Also §94(22) gives an action for damages for unfair labor prac-
tices. (3) Minn. Stat. c. 179 (enacted 1939 and still in effect) §179.11: "It shall
be an unfair labor practice: (1) For any employee or labor organization ..
to violate the terms of such [valid collective] bargaining agreement. .. .
§179.12: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer: (1) To . . .
violate the terms and conditions of such [valid collective] bargaining agree-
ment. . . ." §179.14: "When any unfair labor practice is threatened or com-
mitted, a suit to enjoin such practice may be maintained.... The provisions
of §§185.02 to 185.19 [resembling the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act] shall not apply." (Less stringent procedural safeguards must
be observed.) (4) Wiscosin Stat §111.06(1) f, §111.06(2) (c), §111.07(4)
(enacted 1939 and still in effect) are the same as those of Colorado, above
[Vol. 34
PARADOX OF LABOR LAW
some measure of union responsibility for breach of contract." Though
the statutes of all these states grant specific redress for breach of labor
agreements, yet this Committee in recommending L.M.RtA. §301, which
declares that "suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization" may be brought in United States courts, and
which does not mention the Norris-LaGuardia Act,"' did not indicate
whether the remedy in suits under §301 could be anything but a
"money judgment."'12
Other Congressional committee reports, however, make clear that
Congress intended to leave the Norris-LaGuardia Act operative in this
area' 3 as well as that Congress thought that that Act severely restricted
injunctive relief for breach of contract.' 4
The United States courts have since then declared that the Norris-
LaGuardia Act applies to restrict specific redress for breach of con-
tract.' 5 Thus, in Alcoa Co. v. McMahon, the U.S. Court of Appeals
quoted; but enforcement is entrusted exclusively to the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Board. Cf. Millis and Katz, A Decade of State Labor Legis-
lation, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 282, 308 (1948).
"This Act is mentioned elsewhere, however. (1) By N.L.R.A. §10(h) it is
inapplicable to proceedings under N.L.R.A. §10. (2) By L.M.R.A. §208 (b), 29
U.S.C. §178(b), it is made inapplicable to the "national emergency" procedure.(3) By §302(e), 29 U.S.C. §186(e), it does not affect proceedings to prevent
unlawful payments by employers to unions.
12L.M.R.A. §301(b), 29 U.S.C. §185(b).
"s In the bill, H.R. 3020, that passed the House, §302 was the section which re-
sembles §301 of the Act. Since §302(e) of the House bill expressly exempted
actions for breach of collective agreement from the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
the omission of this exemption from the enacted §301 left the Act applicable.
H. Conf. Rep. 510.
24The Senate report already quoted so states, citing Wilson and Co. v. Birl,
infra note 15, Nevins v. Kasmach, infra note 47, and Bulkin v. Sacks, infra
note 40.
So do the following passages from the House report on H.R. 3020, H. Rep.
245, 80th Cong 1st Sess. (1947). The majority stated that §302(e) of H.R.
3020, which was later struck out, "makes the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplica-
ble in suits and proceedings involving violations of contracts which labor
organizations voluntarily and with their eyes open enter into." The minority
spoke of "the complete inadvisability" of opening up "the federal courts to
petition for injunction in disputes involving violations of union agreements
despite the -provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act banning injunctions in
labor disputes, except after full hearing and upon certain findings."
It is obvious that some sections of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, notably §4
and §5, keep the U.S. courts from restraining activities only of employees and
unions. Textile Workers Union v. Alco Mfg. Co., 27 L.R.R.M. 2164 (D.C.
M.D. N.C., 1950). But the remainder of the Act is operative, whoever may
be plaintiff or defendant.
Alcoa Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp. 541 (D.C. S.D. N.Y., 1948), affd. 173
F. (2d) 567 (2d cir., 1949), cert. den. 338 U. S. 821 (1949) (strike in vio-
lation of contract and of union government). Duris v. Phelps Dodge Corp.,
87 F. Supp. 229, 232 (D.C.N.J., 1949) (interunion contest over bargaining
rights). Both Teller (Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940) Vol.
2, §436 n. 36) and the Senate Labor Committee (S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong. 1st
sess., 1947) say that the earlier case of Wilson and Co. v. Birl, 27 F. Supp.
915 (D.C.E.D. Pa., 1939), affd. 105 F. (2d) 948 (C.C.A. 3d, 1939) where in-junction was denied, involved a breach of contract. This is questionable, for
the existence of a contract is witnessed only by a vague left-handed reference
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for the Second Circuit said :16 "The only question is as to the employers
remedies for this breach of contract. That they may recover judg-
ment from the defendants for damages is undoubted; that they may
recover a similar judgment against the union is conceivable;17 that
they could have procured an injunction in some form before the
Norris-LaGuardia Act we will assume. . . .The defendants' position
is that, in spite of the declaratory judgment [holding the defendants
to be in breach], the refusal [to obey the judgment declaring the con-
tract obligations] raised 'a controversy concerning the terms and con-
ditions of employment' which by [the Act's]definition is a 'labor dis-
pute.' We agree .... -1 So the court refused the injunction sought.
In so doing this court was following the unanimous assumption
of the Supreme Court underlying its elaborate discussion in U.S. v.
United Mine Workers9 of whether a dispute between the govern-
ment and the U.M.W. as representative of the miners in the mines of
which the government was in possession, was reached by the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. This assumption that the Act does not except from its
provisions litigation over obligations created by collective contract is
most clearly stated in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
"The controversy arising under the Lewis-Krug contract concerned
'terms and conditions of employment' and was therefore a 'labor dis-
pute'. ."2 This declaration was irrelevant to Justice Frankfurter's
ground of decision and therefore only dictum. It was essential only
to support the dissenting conclusion of Justices Murphy and Rutledge.
But no judge and no attorney in the case showed any disagreement
with it.21
The application of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to breaches of con-
tract creates a serious inconsistency between it and our national labor
policy of promoting collective bargaining to the formation of con-
in the district judge's opinion, 27 F. Supp. at 918. But the Alcoa decision was
foreshadowed by U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258(1947), where the opinion of the court said (at 270) that it would "probably
be conceded" that if the plaintiff were a private employer instead of the
U.S. "the characteristics of the present case would be such as to bring it
within" the prohibitions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The decision (though
not the opinion) would have been the same whether or not this "concession"
were made.
16 173 F. (2d) 567, 568 (1949).
17 The action was primarily against workers who were striking in violation of
contract and of union discipline. On the responsibility of the union, see 63
Harv. L. Rev. 1035 (1950).
Is The District Court judge also held it to be "indisputable" that this was a "labor
dispute," for which the Norris-LaGuardia Act expressly barred specific relief.
81 F. Supp. 541, 543 (1948).
19 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
20 Ibid. at 312.
21 For the similar statement in the "opinion of the court," see supra note 15.
Neither the trial judge, 70 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. D.C., 1947), nor any of the
attorneys in brief or argument discussed whether breach of contract is within
the coverage of Norris-LaGuardia.
[Vol. 34
PARADOX OF LABOR LAW
tracts.22 The result is the stranger in that contract enforcement pro-
ceedings before courts of states where such suits may be brought (or
before administrative agencies in Colorado and Wisconsin) can not
be defeated by any assertion by the contract-breaker of a substantive
federal right not to be subjected to specific enforcement. For the per-
tinent sections (§4-§9) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act regulate the op-
eration of United States courts, and do not define substantive rights.
L.M.R.A. §301 provides (or confirms) the only national remedy for
breach of collective agreements, but several states have done better.
Collective agreements usually contain machinery for adjudication
of controversies concerning their application. The 1200-page 1949
book of Cases on Labor Relations by Schulman and Chamberlain con-
tains nothing but selected decisions of these contractually-fabricated
tribunals. Their awards are again and again not of money but of spe-
cific redress. The employer is required to restore an employee to his
job, to install a safety device, to allow smoking at certain places and
times, to discharge a person employed contrary to contract standards,
etc. Or the union is required to refrain from soliciting memberships
or collecting dues at certain times and places. Duties so defined are
performed more readily, it seems, than duties imposed by general law,
first, because they are basically self-imposed (imposed through the pro-
cess of bilateral bargaining in the formation and administration of the
labor relations agreement); second, because the price of non-perfor-
mance may be interruption of production (which up to this point us-
ually has not occurred); and, third, because public opinion will almost
certainly condemn the party which refuses to carry out the award of
an arbitrator chosen by the parties. Under these circumstances com-
pliance is rarely withheld. And if it is, it is usually because the award
relates to only a part of the discord between the parties. So even when
compliance does not occur, enforcement by judicial process is rarely
tried, because enforcement of the award alone will not settle the dis-
cord. Yet since the award is nothing but a declaration of the duties of
the parties to the contract and an order to do them-a determination
of just what they ought to do in order to redress a failure to do what
they have voluntarily engaged themselves to do-there is every reason
that the obligation stated by the award should be enforceable to exactly
the same extent as it would be enforceable if it had been explicitly
stated by the parties in their contract.2 3 Just as "the Constitution is
2 This inconsistency was noted even before the enactment of L.M.R.A. §301, 29
U.S.C. §185. Note, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 520, 531 (1938). Cf. Gregory, The Collec-
tive Labor Agreement, its Nature and Scope, 1949 Wash. L. Q. 3, 13.
23 A court wil give specific enforcement to an arbitral award "to the same extent
to which it would compel specific performance had the award been contractu-
ally agreed upon by the parties themselves." Goldstein v. I.L.G.W. Union, 328
Pa. 385, 394, 196 A. 43, 48 (1938).
1951]
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what the judges say it is,'-2- so the contract is what the arbitrator says
it is-the parties have chosen him as their common agent to add these
derivative refinements to fit the particular circumstances of their con-
troversy and thus to settle it. And the courts, when occasionally called
on, should give effect to these derivations as fully as to the original
text. How do state agencies deal with refusal to obey such awards, re-
fusal to arbitrate when the agreement requires arbitration of disputes
and violation of terms when the agreement does not call for arbitra-
tion ?
In Colorado and Wisconsin, an administrative agency was created
by the Labor Peace Act to deal with breaches of collective labor agree-
ments, and refusal to carry out arbitration awards under them. Thus,
whether or not a controversy concerning the meaning and application
of a collective agreement results in an interruption of work, the state
provides for its settlement a permanent specialized tribunal which
issues interlocutory and final orders readily convertible into judicial
decrees.
25
The Labor Peace Act of both states makes it an unfair labor prac-
tice for either party "to violate the terms of a collective agreement
including an agreement to accept an arbitration award," 28 or not to
carry out such an award.27 These provisions are not obscured by the
N.L.R.A. for the latter does not reach the performance of agreements.28
24 Charles Evans Hughes, Addresses and Papers (2d ed. 1916) 185.
25 Supra, note 10. Enforcement of orders of the Industrial Commission (Colo-
rado) or the Employment Relations Board (Wisconsin) in state courts is
much like enforcement of N.L.R.B. orders in U.S. courts.
While the general arbitration act of Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. c. 298), unlike
that of Colorado (Code of Civ. Proc. Rule 109), excepts arbitration of labor
disputes (Wis. Stat. §298.01), voluntary arbitration submissions to the Wis-
consin Employment Relations Board (Wis. Stat. §110.10) or the Colorado
Industrial Commission (Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97 §94(10)) are subjected to the
statutory arbitration procedure. But since neither a refusal to perform a
promise to arbitrate labor disputes that have arisen or may arise, nor a re-
fusal to carry out any award other than one obtained through recourse to this
agency of government, is reached-at least in Wisconsin-by the provision of
the arbitration act, it is the Labor Peace Act that provides public administra-
tive enforcement of collective labor contracts generally.
26 Wis. Stat. §111.06(1) (f), §110.06(2) (c); Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97 §94(6) (1) (f),
§94(6) (2) (c) (with insignificant variations). This duty was enforced in Mad-
ison Bus Co. v. W.E.R.B. (Dane County Circuit Court, Oct. 28, 1949), sup-
porting the order of the W.E.R.B.
27 It is an unfair labor practice "to refuse or fail to recognize or accept as con-
clusive of any issue in any controversy as to employment relations the final
determination, after appeal, if any, of any tribunal having competent juris-
diction of the same or whose jurisdiction [the refusing party] accepted." Wis.
Stat. §111.06(1)(g), §111.06(2)(d); Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97 §94(6)(1)(g)
§94(6) (2)(d) (with insignificant variations). This duty was enforced in
Allis Chalmers v. W.E.R.B., 254 Wis. 484, 37 N.W. (2d) 36 (1949), support-
ing the order of the Board.
s So, despite the eclipse of state legislation by such recent decisions as Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945), Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 330 U.S.
767 (1947), Plankinton Packing Co. v. W.E.R.B., 338 U.S. 953 (1950), and
U.A.W. v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454 (1950), this national law does not hinder the
[Vol. 34
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Nor does the fact that Labor Management Relations Act §301 gives
an action in United States courts for breach of labor agreements de-
tract from the sanction provided by these state laws, for the sanction
provided by the state Labor Peace Act is in addition to or alternative
to any civil action in a state or national court.2 9 And naught in §301
calls for any curtailment of existing remedies.
So in these states the victim of breach of contract may get specific
redress if the administrative agency sees fit to give this remedy.30 And
the agency's order will be enforced by the courts.31 Thus the law of
these states resolves the conflict by subjecting the anti-injunction
policy to the policy of full support of collective contracts.
Redress of breach of collective agreements-including provisions
relating to arbitration-is indeed an increasing concern of the Wiscon-
sin Employment Relations Board. Recently these cases have constituted
more than half of its unfair labor practice decisions.3
state in dealing with breaches of contract. Compare Int. Union v. W.E.R.B.,
336 U.S. 245 (12949). But this view is questionable in the opinion of Cox and
Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 Harv. L. Rev., 211, 227, 243(1950).
Under N.L.R.A. (1947) §8(d) (4), if a party to a collective agreement
resorts to a strike or lockout before the time when proper notice of his desire
to modify or terminate it is effective, he commits the unfair labor practice of
"refusal to bargain." Here, as in other instances of unfair labor practices, the
N.L.R.B. by redressing the unfair practice may be ordering-and under §10(f)
and (j) obtaining enforcement of-specific redress for breach of contract. But
casual coincidence of breach with national unfair labor practices does not
bar states from creating new forms of redress for breach, as by designating
it as a state unfair labor practice.
'2 In both states the Labor Peace Act so provides. Wis. Stat. §111.07(1) ; Colo.
Stat. Ann. c. 97 §94(8) (1). The Colorado Act also gives a civil action as al-
ternative remedy for all unfair labor practices. Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97 §94(22).
The N.L.R.B. does not authorize such actions, Amazon Mills v. Textile
Workers Union, 167 F. (2d) 183 (C.C.A. 4th, 1948), California Ass. v. Build-ing Trades Council, 178 F. (2d) 175, 178 (9th cir., 1949), but L.M.R.A.
§303 gives a civil action, including specific redress, for the strikes described
in N.L.R.A. (1947) §8(b) (4). And some of the new unfair labor practices
coincide with preexisting torts, North Electric Mfg. Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 136
(1949).30 In both states the agency must act "(quasi-judicially) when an interested party
files a complaint. In Colorado it may take over the complaint as its own or
initiate a proceeding. Wis Stat. §111.07(2) (a); Colo. Sfat. Ann. c. 97 §94(8)(2) (a). The actual practice in Colorado, however, seems to be to proceed
only if the defendant consents.
31Wis. Stat. §111.97(7) and (8); Colo. Stat Ann. c. 97 §94(8) (7) and (8).
These statutes, unlike N.L.R.A. §10(h), do not explicitly exclude the applica-
tion of the anti-injunction act (Wis. Stat. §103.56; Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97 §31)
as a bar to enforcement of orders in unfair labor practice cases, but the anti-
injunction act clearly does not bar such enforcement. Cf. Public Service Em-
ployees Union v. W.E.R.B., 246 Wis. 190, 16 N.W. (2d) 823 (1944), where
the Board was sustained in an order prohibiting continued breach of con-
tract (a strike).
32 The Colorado Commission informs me that it has entered only one cease and
desist order and this was reversed in district court. Letter of secretary, dated
April 25, 1950. See Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Acts (1948) 137.
Of the Wisconsin Board's recent unfair labor practice decisions, however,
more than half deal with complaints of breach of collective agreement. Be-
tween March 31, 1949, and March 30, 1950, inclusive, it announced decisions
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Typical of the Board's attitude in these cases is its opinion of May
20, 1949, in Amalgamated Association v. Madison Bus Co. (Decision
No. 2083-A), which involved the relatively rare contract term that the
parties shall arbitrate unagreed terms of a successor contract. Order-
ing the employer to arbitrate, the Board said:
"Some doubt arose in the minds of this Board as to whether or
not provisions contained in collective bargaining agreements which
provide for the arbitration of future disputes are enforceable in Wis-
consin. It is clear that at common law, a general agreement to submit
to final determination by arbitration the rights and liabilities of the
parties with respect to any and all disputes that may hereafter arise
out of the contract is voidable by either party at any time before a
valid award is made, and will not be enforced by the courts.33 5 Am.
Juris. 857. In so far as commercial arbitrations are concerned, this
rule was changed by Section 298.01 of the Wisconsin Statutes. That
provision of the Statutes made enforceable any agreement to settle by
arbitration any controversies arising out of contracts, but excluded
from those enforceable, those between employers and employees, or
between employers and associations of employees, except as is provided
in Section 111.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes. Section 111.10 authorizes
the parties to a labor dispute to agree in writing to have the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board act or name arbitrators to act in such dis-
putes. When such an agreement is made, it can be enforced by the
courts. It is apparent that the only agreement between an employer and
a union to submit questions in dispute to arbitration that will be en-
forced by the courts in Wisconsin under chapter 298 of the Statutes,
is an agreement naming this Board or one of its appointees to arbitrate
such dispute.
"The State of Wisconsin has been a leader in attempting to devise
methods of reducing industrial disputes. The uniform trend in legis-
in 43 unfair labor practice cases, for which it issued an opinion and a mimeo-
graphed release. Of these 23 dealt with alleged breaches of collective agree-
ment, 21 being brought by a union or an employee against an employer, one
by an employer against a union, and one by an employee against a union.
The board gave redress to the complainant in 12 of the 21 cases against an
employer and in the case of the employee against the union.
A count of all the Wisconsin Board's cases charging violation of the para-
graphs of the Statutes mentioned in notes 26 and 27, supra, shows that in
1939-42 (3V years) final decisions (by Board or court reviewing Board)
disposed of 16 cases, in 1943-46 (4 years) 21 cases, in 1947-50 (3V years)
56 cases, total (11 years) 93 cases, about 30 of which in the last year and
a half. Every one of the 16 Board decisions of this type carried to the courts
has been affirmed. Of the 93 cases, 77 were complaints against employers un-
der §111.06(1) (f), 11 under §111.06(1) (g), 3 complaints against unions under
§111.06(2) (c), and 2 under §111.06(2) (d).
33 It would be more exact to say that courts refuse specific performance, and
loss can rarely be proved with sufficient certainty to win damages. 47 L.R.A(N.S.) 408-410.
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lation throughout the country has been toward the encouragement of
collective bargaining. Nothing will encourage labor and management
to settle disputes without resort to force more than a labor agreement
reached by the parties. The grievance machinery in most of these
collective bargaining agreements provides for a peaceful means of dis-
posing of future controversies arising out of the contract by arbitra-
tion. There is no good reason why such machinery could not be set
up in the agreement and used by the parties. We are satisfied that the
Legislature had these thoughts in mind when they included among the
unfair labor practices in Section 111.06 (1) (f) and (2) (c), this
policy. By making it an unfair labor practice for either the employer
or the union to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement,
including an agreement to accept an arbitration award, the Legisla-
ture was endeavoring to encourage labor and management to settle
its disputes without force and through a grievance machinery culminat-
ing in arbitration. Such agreements were made enforceable, and the
enforcement of them entrusted to this Board.
"We are satisfied that chapter 298 of the Wisconsin Statutes in
no way conflicts with the provisions of capter 111 ... Nothing is more
important for the maintenance of industrial peace than for both parties
to peacefully carry out any agreements they may have entered into.
Here we have an agreement which, by its terms, provides for a method
of settlement when the parties are unable to agree upon such settlement
thmselves. The union has requested the employer to comply with
such agreement. Although the employer has refused, it has by the
order made today, been required to comply with such agreement." 34
The steady increase of contract-breach cases that are coming to
the Wisconsin Board in its eleven years of operation, though the cases
are not impressive in numbers or importance, is, I believe, an indica-
tion that agencies of government fit for this type of adjudication will
be more and more wanted.35 The private umpire system now so com-
mon has much to recommend it to the employers' association or the
very large employer, but it is an extravagant system where a contract
34 The Board's order was enforced by the Circuit Court for Dane County, Madi-
son Bus Co. v. W.E.R.B. (Oct. 28, 1949). This case was not appealed. A few
days later a declaratory judgment on the question of breach of a contract
provision for arbitration was sustained by the state Supreme Court. Local
1111 v. Allen Bradley Co., 255 Wis. 613, 39 N.W. (2d) 740 (1949). "Whether
the respondents would be entitled to a further remedy in a court of equity
need not now be considered." Ibid. at 618 and at 742.
35 Wolf, The Enforcement of Collective Labor Agreements: A Proposal, 5 Law
and Contemporary Problems 273 (1938). Pipin, Enforcement of Rights under
Collective Bargaining Agreements, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 651 (1939). Cf. bill
S. 937, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Labor courts of this kind have proved
useful in Sweden and other countries. Schmidt and Heineman, Enforcement
of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Swedish Law, 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
184 (1947). International Labour Office, Labour Courts (1938); Labour
Courts in Latin America (1947).
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covers a small group of workers, for arbitration has to be set up spe-
cially for each of the occasional controversies that arise. While the
governmental agency widely available-the regular courts-has dis-
advantages of formality, delay, and inexpertness in labor relations that
make it unattractive ( at least to the union, usually the initiating party),
a state agency which itself or by its experienced delegates operates
as an arbitrator of contract disputes will have all the advantages of
public authority, economy, and continuity that characterize courts, com-
bined in some degree with the advantages of flexibility,36 speed, and
special knowledge of labor relations that give value today to the party-
chosen permanent umpire under the contracts of large corporations or
employers' associations in the automobile, meat packing, hosiery, and
other industries. Whatever we think of "socialized medicine," social-
ized adjudication is a tradition of long undisputed standing. Even
when parties have agreed to arbitrate, as in the Madison Bus Company
case, public command may still be necessary to assure performance.
Today, before such "labor courts" have developed, the state courts
handle enough labor contract cases 37 to make it important to note how
they are dealing with the conflict between legislative policies of pro-
moting collective bargaining and of denying specific relief for breach
of collective contract. This question arises in state courts because acts
similar to the Norris-LaGuardia Act have been passed by many states.
What are "labor disputes," what is a case "involving or growing out
of a labor dispute," to which these statutes apply?
These state statutes are not always mere reflections of the national
act.-" Starting with the same statutory definition of "labor disputes,"
the courts of different states have disagreed; and the question whether
a case in which the issue is breach of collective agreement is one in-
volving a labor dispute has come up in a number of states.39
86 Predictability of Results in Commercial Arbitration, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1022,
1026 (1948). Case Law or Free Decision in Grievance Arbitration, 62 Harv.
L. Rev. 118, 125 (1948).
37 Witmer, Collective Bargaining Agreements in the Courts, 48 Yale L. J. 195
(1938). Lenhoff, The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American
Legal System, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1109 (1941). Pipin, Enforcement of Rights
under Collective Bargaining Agreements, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 651 (1939).
38 The Wisconsin Act, Wis. Laws of 1931 c. 376, antedated the national act, and
is more sweeping. Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining (1940)§434, says that statutes of five other states are of this type, while 13 have fol-
lowed the national act more closely. With the adoption of diverging amend-
ments state statutes are becoming more and more differentiated from one
another and from the national act.89 Teller, id. §436. Whether or not a suit to enforce a collective agreement is a
"labor dispute," picketing to cause an alleged contract-breaker to comply
with the contract is said to be such. Marvel Bakery Co. v. Teamsters Union,
5 Wn. (2d) 346, 105 P. (2d) 46 (1940) (injunction against picketing re-
versed; also because of lawfulness of picketing). But picketing to obtain
redress for breach of a contract that has expired is said not to be a labor
dispute. Jensen v. Local Union No. 356, 194 Minn. 58, 259 N.W. 811 (1935)
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In Pennsylvania the courts no longer have to answer this question
because the legislature in 193940 amended the anti-injunction act to
provide that it should not apply in any case "involving a labor dispute
as defined herein, which is in disregard, breach, or violation of, or
which tends to procure the disregard, breach, or violation of, a valid
subsisting labor agreement" arrived at between employer and repre-
sentatives of his employees, pursuant to the state or national labor
relations act, provided the plaintiff has not committed an unfair labor
practice or violated the agreement. 41
The Minnesota legislation of 1939 similarly settled the question in
favor of contract enforcement.4
Colorado's anti-injunction act, without having been invoked in any
reported contract-breach cases, was repealed in 1943 by the Labor
Peace Act.
43
The Oregon act was said to be no bar to specific redress of con-
tract-breach and a new law in 1947 makes this certain. The cases are
examined later."
But the Indiana Supreme Court has recently ruled, without an
opinion, that breach of collective agreement is a "labor dispute" within
the act.45
(injunction against picketing sustained). Cf. Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S.
306 (1926).
40 1939 P.L. 302, 43 P.S. §206d(a). A lower court had applied the anti-injunction
act to such a dispute. Bulkin v. Sacks, 31 Pa. D. and C. 501 (C.P., Phila-
delphia Co., 1938).41 Interpreting this act: Ralston v. Cunningham, 143 Pa. Super. Ct. 412, 18 A.(2d) 108 (1940) ; Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
353 Pa. 420, 45 A. (2d) 857 (1946) (esp. the dissenting opinion). See also
infra note 73, quoting an Oregon act apparently of similar effect.
42Supra, note 10. J. F. Quest Foundry Co. v. Intl. Molders Union, 216 Minn.
436, 13 N.W. (2d) 32 (1944). Prior to the act of 1939 and while a Norris-
LaGuardia-like state act was in force, it was held that picketing to obtain
redress for breach of a collective contract that had expired was not a "labor
dispute" covered by that act. Jensen v. Local No. 356, supra, note 39. Whether
picketing to obtain compliance with an existing contract would be a labor
dispute hardly needs decision, since the conduct would probably be lawful
self-help unless prohibited by the contract. See Marvel Bakery Co. v. Team-
sters Union, supra, note 39. But these cases, in which the alleged breach is by
the plaintiff, shed no light on our problem of what redress may be obtained
against a contract-breaking defendant.
'
3 Supra, note 10.
But the 1943 act reenacts it in part: Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 97 §94(16), similar
to §4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The probable effect of this is to restrict
specific relief on demand of a litigant in court, but not to affect the Industrial
Commission's handling of unfair labor practices. In court a suitor may get
"damages" for any unfair labor practice, §94(22). But this does not neces-
sarily mean that he may not get specific relief in court for the unfair labor
practice of breach of contract or for the common law wrong. There are
no reported cases. The Secretary of the Commission believes that no court
has construed §94(22). Letter to me dated April 25, 1950.
Infra, note 71, and related text.
45 Faultless Caster Corp. v. United Electrical Workers, 86 N.E. (2d) 703, 706
(Ind. App. 1949). The Appellate Court, following this edict, held also that a
labor union can not sue. The net result was that the remedy for an employer's
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California has never had an anti-injunction act and in 1941 ex-
pressly authorized injunctions for enforcement of collective agree-
ments.4"
In New York, Nevins v. Kasmach4 7 is the only Court of Appeals
decision discussing even briefly the application of the anti-injunction
act4 8 to a breach of contract claim. Here the injunction was held fitting
since the complaint contained "all the allegations required by §876-a of
the Civil Practice Act prerequisite to the granting of equitable relief."
The decision treats breach of contract as a "labor dispute," but does
not elaborate, probably because the statute contains other language"0
that shows that breach of contract is within its coverage.
But the Court of Appeals subsequently held that it was not a
"labor dispute" to picket an employer for complying with a certification
of representative by the state labor relations board, saying: "It is im-
possible [to hold] that any 'labor dispute' . . . under §876-a . . . sur-
vived the certification of the Labor Relations Board of the collective
bargaining agent for the plaintiff's employees and the execution of the
collective bargaining contract."'" Is there any good reason for holding
that a party breaking the contract is engaged in a "labor dispute" when
it is held that one interfering with its peaceful performance by the
parties to it is not engaged in a "labor dispute?" Is not a settlement
achieved by contract without a statutory election when there is no con-
test over representation as deserving of specific protection as one
achieved by a statutory election plus a contract?
Despite the statutory language lower New York courts have since
the Nevins case found ways of avoiding the restriction of §87 6-a in
contract-breach cases. Thus in one case it was held that §876-a(4)
contained alternative requirements for qualifying for any injunction,
breach was a money judgment for individual employees if they could show
loss. This is hardly twentieth century law.46Supra, note 10.
47279 N.Y. 323, 18 N.E. (2d) 294 (1938).
48 N.Y. Civ. Practice Act. §876-a.
49279 N.Y. 323, 325, 18 N.E. (2d) 294, 295 (1938).
50 Section 876-a(1) requires for issuing an injunction: "(a) that unlawful acts
have or a breach of any contract not contrary to public policy has been threat-
ened or committed and such acts or breach will be executed or continued un-
less restrained....", thus making the act apply to breaches of contract as well
as torts. The corresponding language in the Norris-LaGuardia Act §7 is: "(a)
that unlawful acts have been threatened and will be continued unless re-
strained ......
Oddly cnough, Judge Rifkind in Alcoa SS Co. v. McMahon, 81 F. Supp.
541, note 2 (D.C.S.D.N.Y., 1948), intimated that the N.Y. act and the Nevins
case, unlike the national act, excepted suits for breach of contract from the
anti-injunction restriction.
51 Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N.Y. 188, 200, 42
N.E. (2d) 480, 485 (1942) (with vigorous dissent). Serval Slide Fasteners
Inc. v. Molfetta, 70 N.Y.S. (2d) 411 (S.Ct., Queens Co., 1947). And see New
York cases, infra, note 68.
[Vol. 34
PARADOX OF LABOR LAW
though the section clearly states cumulative requirements.52 Again
Nevins v. Kasmach 3 was (I think incorrectly) interpreted to mean that
where a union violates an agreement not to strike, "the court may
accord injunctive relief upon general equitable grounds. In such event
compliance with the procedural requirements of the statute does not
constitute a condition precedent to the award of relief."5 And, on the
even slimmer ground that §876-a is merely declaratory of existing law,
it was held proper to prohibit picketing and require arbitration accord-
ing to contract terms.55 Moreover breach of collective agreemcnt has
been described as not a "labor dispute."58 Finally §876-a was com-
pletely ignored where specific enforcement of an arbitration clause was
obtained.
5 7
The upper New York courts, however, undoubtedly recognize
§876-a to cover redress for breach of contract,58 but are very ready
to grant injunctions in these cases.50
Massachusetts courts grant specific redress by reasoning that affirm-
ative enforcement is different from prohibition and that the anti-injunc-
52 Vim Electric Co. Inc. v. Solomon, 67 N.Y.S. (2d) 908 (S. Ct. Kings Co., 1947).
Subsection 4 (which is Norris-LaGuardia Act §8) says: "No injunctive relief
shall be granted to any plaintiff who has failed to plead and prove compliance
with any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in
question, or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dis-
pute. . ." The "or" is not alternative in such a negative command.
53Supra, note 47.54 Diamond Candle Co. v. Fratello, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 346 (S.Ct. Kings Co., 1939).
55 Uneeda Credit Clothing Stores v. Briskin, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 964 (S.Ct. Kings
Co., 1939), purporting to follow Greater City Master Plumbers Ass. Inc. v.
Kahme, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 587 (S.Ct. N.Y. Co., 1937), where, however, the court
had declared that "the prerequisite facts necessary to the issuance of an in-
junction, as provided in §876-a, exist," but the facts stated by the court do
not so indicate, and the court cited as precedents cases decided before the
enactment of §876-a in 1935. Both these cases relate to strikes apparently in
violation of arbitration clauses (though in the Plumbers case the plaintiff is
not seeking enforcement of the arbitration clause).58 J. I. Hass Co. Inc. v. McNamara, 21 N.Y.S. (2d) 441 (S.Ct. Queens Co., 1940).
5 7 Ass. of Master Painters v. Brotherhood of Painters, 64 N.Y.S. (2d) 405
(S.Ct. N.Y. Co., 1946), affd. 271 App. Div. 868, 66 N.Y.S. (2d) 626 (1st dept.,
1946) (no strike).
s See, for instance, DeNeri v. Gene Louis, Inc., 261 App. Div. 920, 25 N.Y.S.
(2d) 463 (2d dept., 1940), dismissed without prej. 288 N.Y. 592, 42 N.E. (2d)
602 (1942).
59 Nevins v. Kasmach, note 47, above. Murphy v. Ralph, 299 N.Y.S. 270 (S.Ct.
N.Y. Co., 1937) and Carroll Towing Co. v. United Marine Division, 91 N.Y.S.
(2d) 431 (S.Ct N.Y. Co., 1949).
So "in New York ... some courts hold that such [contract-breach] suits
do and others that they do not constitute 'labor disputes' but almost all grant
injunctive relief at all events." Teller, supra, note 38, 1950 Supp. §441 n. 74a.
As a limitation of remedy against unions, the term "labor dispute" in
§876-a (apart from breach of contract cases) is being drained of significance.
For if the defendant's tactics are lawful, obviously plaintiff is entitled to no
redress; but (despite the statutory language, quoted in note 50, supra) "unless
the objective of the defendant union is a lawful one, this controversy is not
a labor dispute in the sense of §876-a." Am. Guild of Musical Artists v.
Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, 231, 36 N.E. (2d) 123, 125 (1941). Thus "it is now
well settled that §876-a does not apply where the union engages in picketing
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tion statute refers only to the latter :60 "A decree in affirmative form
.. would not in our opinion be an injunction within the meaning" of
the anti-injunction act; many of its provisions "would be out of place
if the statute had been intended to control the granting of affirmative
relief." 1 This distinction seems artificial,52 though it is obvious that
the anti-injunction statutes speak most appositely of prohibitory in-
junctions. 63
In Wisconsin the anti-injunction act is in part substantive law."
Clearly its statutory declaration that "ceasing or refusing to perform
any work" is lawful,65 can not mean that it is lawful to refuse to per-
to attain an unlawful objective or to enforce an unlawful demand." Wilson v.
Hacker, 27 L.R.R.M. 2064, 2071 (N.Y. S.Ct. Erie Co., 1950), citing the fore-
going case. But see Mayer Bros. v. Meltzer, 27 L.R.R.M. 2027 (N.Y. S.Ct.
N.Y., 1950) denying injunction, despite s.c., 274 App. Div. 169, 80 N.Y.S. (2d)
874 (1st dept., 1948).
60 Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., 316 Mass. 631, 56 N.E. (2d) 1 (1944).6 1 Sanford v. Boston Edison Co., supra, note 60, at 638, and at 5.
61t was rejected by New York courts. Scafidi v. Debner, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 390
(S.Ct. Bronx Co., 1940). Green Bus Lines v. Blynn, 61 N.Y.S. (2d) 663 (S.Ct.Queens Co., 1945). See also annotation of the Sanford case, 156 A.L.R. 646,
658, 683.6 3 The words enjoin and injunction in legal speech, because usually referring to
negative orders, have acquired a secondary meaning of prohibit and prohibi-
tion. It is regrettable that when we say that a court "enjoins" certain conduct,
we may mean either that the court commands it, requires it, or, its direct op-
posite, forbids it, outlaws it. The words might well be abandoned since words
in plenty are the equivalent of each meaning and of that meaning alone.66Laws of 1931 c. 376. The section (now Wis. Stat. §103.53) resembling Norris-
LaGuardia Act §4 starts: "The following acts, whether performed singly or
in concert, shall be legal: (a) ceasing or refusing to perform any work. .."
This act is sometimes called the Wisconsin labor code, sharply differentiating
it from the New York act, which quite properly is part of the Civil Procedure
Act.
Its effect as substantive law is recognized in Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
301 U.S. 468 (1937), and Lauf v. E. G. Shinners Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938), both
relating to occurrences prior to the national and state labor relations acts. The
Wisconsin Act, however, is procedural (or remedial) as well as substantive,
for, besides declaring these activities legal (in Wisconsin), it also forbids
Wisconsin courts to prohibit these activities (anywhere). One is reminded
of U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), where the Supreme Court read
the Norris-LaGuardia Act as an enlargement of the Clayton Act (substantive),
though at the same time it remains a procedural (or remedial) restriction on
U.S. courts in all litigation. But the Hutcheson case did not-and Congress
has no constitutional power to-declare such conduct generally lawful; it de-
clared only that the curse of the Sherman Act no longer reached it. This amal-
gamation of the Norris-LaGuardia Act with the Clayton Act is feasible only
because the Sherman Act is enforced only by U.S. courts.
Despite this national legislation state legislation or common law remains
in force; for the Sherman Act, it is said, "does not purport to afford remedies
for all torts committed by or against persons engaged in interstate commerce
... Whether the respondents' conduct amounts to an actionable wrong...
under Pennsylvania law is not our [the U.S. court's] concern" in a case based
on the Sherman Act. Hunt v. Crumbock, 325 U.S. 821, 826 (1945). If, like
the N.L.RLA., supra, note 28, the Sherman-Clayton-Norris legislation eclipsed
state law in the same field, Giboney v. Empire Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949), would
have been decided the other way.65 Wis. St. §103.53(1) (a). The exception of breach of lawful promises is clearly
implied, for the subsection denies the exception of breach of unlawful prom-
ises (the "yellow dog" contracts outlawed by §103.52).
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form work even if you have contracted to perform it; and-another
provision in the same section that does not appear in his verbis in the
.national act-the declaration that "peaceful picketing and patrolling,
whether engaged in singly or in numbers, shall be legal"6 6 can not mean
that even if the union is bound by collective contract not to strike and
picket but to arbitrate, it is still lawful for it to picket. And though
the rest of the act, including the definition of "labor dispute," is like
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the limitations on injunctive relief might
easily (though of course not inevitably) be interpreted to imply the
same exceptions of breach of contract duty, as are implied in the sub-
sections quoted above. The courts have enforced orders of the state
Employment Relations Board requiring compliance with contracts
without mention of the anti-injunction act.e7
Thus state anti-injunction acts (except that of New York, which
expressly mentions breach of contract) are not being applied to hinder
specific relief for breach of contract. I have not tried to dig out the
legislative history of these acts. It is hard to find, scarce at best, and
has not been mentioned by the courts. But it may be said with the
assurance of general knowledge, though specific ignorance, that the
states were not consciously departing from the Norris-LaGuardia Act
when they enacted their statutes at approximately the same time and
used the same language in defining labor disputes. The state court de-
cisions therefore to some slight extent may, indeed, be treated as inter-
pretations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Is it then reasonable for the United States courts to treat the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act as a bar to specific relief against breach of con-
tract? May not "labor dispute" properly have a narrower meaning than
any dispute between unions and management concerning terms of
work? To be sure, these Acts say it means "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment or concerning representation of per-
sons in negotiating... maintaining ... seeking to arrange" such terms,
language which could include breach of the terms agreed on. Yet, de-
spite this language, a controversy "concerning representation" in settle-
ment of which the Board has certified a bargaining representative, is
beyond the reach of state anti-injunction acts.es And the same question
6 6 Wis. St. §103.53(1) (1).
67Supra, notes 31 and 34. Other (circuit court) cases are summarized in the
digest of Labor Peace Act decisions now in preparation for publication by the
Board.
68 Supra, note 51, for New York cases and infra, note 71, for Oregon cases. Cox,
Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 27, n. 109 (1947), cites
other leading state cases.
The only state cases that arrive at a contrary conclusion are based either
on an aggrandizement of the constitutional protection of freedom of speech,
e.g. the cases cited by Cox as contra, that has since been rejected in Building
Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950), affg 34 Wn. (2d)
38, 207 P. (2d) 699 (1949), or on the view that sometimes picketing of labor
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on the national level has been dealt with by statute in the same way.6 9
Nor is there anything in the legislative history of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act that indicates whether it was intended to restrict spe-
cific remedies for breach of contract duties. Indeed nothing in its con-
gressional history indicates any concern about enforcement or preven-
supply is not directed to make the employer dishonor the certification, but to
persuade the workers to support or shift allegiance to the picketing union, e.g.
State v. Superior Court, 24 Wn. (2d) 314, 164 P.(2d) 662 (1945), and Park
and Tilford Corp. v. Int. Brotherhood, 27 Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891(1946) (lawfulness the issue; no anti-injunction act in Cal.). A representation
contest that has not yet been settled or that has revealed that no union is
favored by the employees, leaves the anti-injunction act effective. Grossman
v. McDonough, 27 L.R.R.M. 2056 (N.Y. S.Ct., 1950). Stein's Wines, Inc. v.
O'Grady, 75 N.Y.S. (2d) 627 (S. Ct. N.Y. Co., 1947). Baker Hotel v. Em-
ployees Local, 187 Ore. 58, 207 P. (2d) 1129 (1949) (under an act that might
easily be read to provide the reverse). Contra (where the "no union" prefer-
ence of the employees was indisputable, but there had been no decision by pub-
lic authorities) : Gazzam v. Building Service Employees Union, 29 Wn. (2d)
488, 188 P. (2d) 97 (1947), 34 Wn. (2d) 38, 207 P. (2d) 699 (1949), aff'd.
339 U.S. 532 (1950). Also it has been held that the employer may have an
injunction against a rival union when there is a contract made pursuant to a
bargaining relationship duly established though without Board certification.
Dinny and Robbins, Inc. v. Davis, 290 N.Y. 101, 48 N.E. (2d) 280 (1943)
(with vigorous dissent), cert. den. 319 U.S. 774 (1943). Loevin Inc. v.
Harlem Labor Union, 92 N.Y. S. (2d) 776 (S.Ct. N.Y. Co., 1949). Pac. Nay.
Inc. v. Nat. Org. of Masters, 33 Wn. (2d) 675, 207 P. (2d) 221 (1949). But
if there is doubt about whom the employees wish to have represent them and
an accessible public agency to settle the doubt (which there was not in Wash-
ington), such rulings are wrong, for the court is really passing on a represen-
tation question that belongs to that agency, certainly a labor dispute. However,
the New York Court of Appeals holds that a contract is presumed valid until
the Board finds otherwise. Matter of Levinsohn Corp., 299 N.Y. 454, 87 N.E.
(2d) 510 (1949). When a certified union, with which the employer has a con-
tract, splits, the employer does not have to satisfy the anti-injunction act in
order to obtain specific protection against picketing by either fraction. Wol-
chok v. Kovenetsky, 274 App. Div. 282, 83 N.Y.S. (2d) 431 (1st dept., 1948).69 N.L.R.A. (1947) §8(b) (4) (c) and §10(1) and L.M.R.A. §303(a) (3), 29 U.S.C.
§187(a) (3). Injunctive relief is obtainable only by the N.L.R.B., however,
not by a private party. Before this statute (and still in situations not covered
by it) the picture in the United States courts in hazy. Where the dispute is
over representation, it has been held to be a "labor dispute" before the
N.L.R.B. has acted. Fur Workers Union v. Fur Workers Union, 105 F. (2d)
1 (Ct. of App. D.C., 1939) aff'd. p. cur. 308 U.S. 522 (1939). Likewise after
an N.L.R.B election in favor of no collective bargaining. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. Quick Charge, Inc., 168 F. (2d) 513 (C.C.A. 10th,
1948). On the other hand, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was held not to prevent
relief to protect the relationship between the employer and the certified union.
Oberman and Co. v. United Garment Workers, 21 F. Supp. 20 (D.C.W.D. Mo.,
1937). It has been said that this case has been overruled. Comment, 34 Cal.
L. Rev. 592 (1946). And certainly courts have denied relief, on the ground
that the N.L.R.B. was the only channel of redress (though it could then give
none to an employer so harassed). United Electric Workers v. International
Brotherhood, 115 F. (2d) 488 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940) (without mention of Norris-
LaGuardia). Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, 59 F. Supp. 625 (D.C.D. Minn.,
1945) (relying on Norris-LaGuardia). And, again unlike state courts, U.S.
courts deny relief, because of Norris-LaGuardia, where the dispute arises from
a split within a union having a contract. Duris v. Phelps Dodge Corp., supra,
note 15 (contest over bargaining rights). Yet contests over property rights in
union schisms are held not to be "labor disputes" governed by Norris-La-
Guardia. Fitzgerald v. Abramson, 89 F. Supp. 504, 509 (S.D. N.Y., 1950).
Schnitzler v. Scida, 27 L.R.R.M. 2025 (E.D.N.Y., 1950).
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tion of breach of collective agreements.70 So the position of the United
States courts that have considered the question has no leg of legislative
interpretation to stand on.
Nowhere do I find the argument against this position better stated
than by the Oregon Supreme Court in Markham and Callow, Inc. v.
International Woodworkers7 1 the Oregon statute being the same as the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The court's statement is broader than the case
before it necessitated, for it was dealing with picketing by a rival union
against an employer who had a contract with the union certified by the
N.L.R.B.72
Said Justice Brand for the unanimous court after a detailed review
of cases from many jurisdictions:
"In the process of construction it must be remembered that the
Oregon Anti-Injunction Act, O.C.L.A. 102-913 et seq., was adopted
in 1933, before the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act, and
therefore before the procedure for collective bargaining had become
standardized. At that time there were grave doubts concerning the
validity of union shop contracts. No established procedure existed
for determining the appropriate unit for collective bargaining or for
the certification of the agency chosen by the majority of the employees
in that unit. It can scarcely be thought that it was the intent of the
state statute to limit the power of equity when asserted in aid of collec-
tive bargaining procedures which were nonexistent at the time that the
act was passed. As said by this court:
'It does not, however, follow that in construing the statute
for the purpose of determining whether a labor dispute, as de-
fined in §13, exists, the court is precluded from looking at the
end sought to be accomplished by the picketing. As in other
cases, it is the court's province and duty to be governed, not by
the letter, but by the spirit of the law.' Schwab v. Moving Pic-
ture Machine Operators (supra) at p. 619 [165 Ore. 602, 109 P.
(2d) 600, 606 (1941)].
"The provisions of the 1933 act should not be construed as nullify-
ing or impeding the peaceful settlement of labor controversies, which
settlements have been consummated by contracts lawfully executed
between an employer and the legal representative of a majority of his
employees. Yet that will be the unfortunate result if the defendants
are permitted to picket for the purpose of inducing the breach of the
collective bargaining contract in the case at bar.
70 This statement is based on a thorough examination of Congressional hearings,
reports, and debates on the Act, which was made at my request by Robert D.
Junig, a student editor of the Wisconsin Law Review. It is noteworthy that in
Frankfurter and Green, The Labor Injunction (1930), which helped to pre-
cipitate the Act, the enforcement of collective agreements is not mentioned.
7' 170 Ore. 517, 563-5, 135 P. (2d) 727, 745 (1943).72 Supra, notes 51 and 68.
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"The Oregon statute itself discloses no such intention. The public
polic- applicable to the construction of the act is clearly stated in
O.C.L.A. 102-913, where it is declared that
'It is necessary that he [the worker] have full freedom of
association, self-organization and designation of representatives
of his own choosing to negotiate the terms and conditions of his
employment....'
"To what purpose is this legislative declaration of policy if the
performance of a contract which embodies the 'terms and conditions
of his employment' and which was negotiated by 'representatives of
his own choosing' may be obstructed by picketing and if the very
statute which was intended to foster collective bargaining is to be con-
strued as preventing equity from protecting the very objectives for
the attainment of which the Statute was enacted?
"Again, in a case such as this, involving interstate commerce, the
intent of the National Labor Relations Act must be fully considered.
The question is not whether the statute has been formally amended. If,
operating within the commerce power, the federal statute establishes
a national public policy, and the instant case involves interstate com-
merce, as it does, then that policy must be respected by state courts,
and the substantive rights concerning collective bargaining which the
federal statute creates should not be impaired by construing a state
statute to cover situations which were non-existent when the statute
was passed."78
So, I submit, "labor dispute" means only the sort of labor contro-
versy for which the parties have not framed a rule or a way of achiev-
ing a settlement. In this sort of controversy, but, it seems to me, not
in a controversy concerning the meaning and application of a contract,
the statute provides that economic pressure, even unlawful economic
pressure, shall not be interfered with by specific order of the court
except upon fulfillment of stringent conditions. This leaves the parties
subject to the criminal law and civil action for damages (both tempered
by jury trial). But to deny a plaintiff the support of a specific order
73 Cf. Stone Logging Co. v. International Woodworkers, 171 Ore. 13, 135 P. (2d)
759 (1943), where the injunction was denied, the representation contest be-
tween the unions being undecided; Peters v. Central Labor Council, 179 Ore.
870, 169 P. (2d) 870 (1946), where this distinction was reaffirmed; and Baker
Hotel v. Employees Local, 187 Ore. 58, 207 P. (2d) 1129 (1949), where despite
a majority vote of employees, under Oregon Laws of 1947 c. 355, in favor of
terminating a labor dispute, the union and the union-minded minority of em-
ployees were held to be entitled to continue picketing. Section 3 of this
statute reads in part: "If a majority of the employees in the collective bar-
gaining unit vote... against the continuance of the labor dispute or if .- . a
collective bargaining agreement is entered into, the labor dispute shall be
deemed to be terminated." The latter alternative (not invoked in the Baker
Hotel case) seems to affirm the view of the court in the case of Markham v.
International Woodworkers, supra, note 71.
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of a court to assist in the realization of legal rights arising by collective
agreement is to withdraw the power of public command just where
long-run decency of relations makes it wholly desirable that it be
used. While the Supreme Court seems to regard the Norris-LaGuardia
Act as having just this effect, I do not think that the U.M.W.A. dictum
or the Alcoa denial of certiorari7' are sufficiently conclusive to foreclose
my appeal for a reconsideration (or a thorough first consideration)
of the matter.
The opinions in the lower United States courts are not very per-
suasive. On the one hand, is the Alcoa case, full of heed to the purpose
of Congress in enacting the Taft-Hartley Act but without inquiry about
the purpose of Congress in enacting the Norris-LaGuardia Act. On
the other hand, we find cases involving labor arbitration contracts
where Norris-LaGuardia is ignored and all attention is paid to the
United States Arbitration Act.75 It is true that till recently labor arbi-
tration has never been subjected to this act ;76 but Norris-LaGuardia has
never been mentioned as ground for denial of relief, though some sec-
tions of it-such as §7 and §9-seem to be very pertinent."
So far as the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended in 1932 to protect
unions from the abuse of "government by injunction," there seems no
reason to extend a protection appropriate to arm's length relations-
apparently the only ones thought of by the legislators, court enforce-
74 Supra, note 15.
75 9 U.S.C. "§§1-14. Though passed seven years before the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
it is not settled whether it applieg to collective labor agreements. Comment,
Arbitration of Labor Contract Interpretation Disputes. 43 Ill. L. Rev. 678, n. 3(1948). State anti-injunction acts have not blocked enforcement of such arbi-
tration. Ibid. 683.
76 In United Office Workers v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602(D.C.E.D. Pa., 1950), however, the order to arbitrate was granted, despite
Int. Union of Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.(2d) 33 (C.C.A. 4th, 1948), where the agreement to arbitrate was not en-
forced because of the exclusion by the U.S. Arbitration Act of "contracts
for employment." Similar exclusions are made by many state arbitration acts.
Sturges, Commercial Arbitration and Awards (1930) §27. Supra, note 25.
While the United Office Workers case is the first to hold a collective labor
agreement fully within the Act (not *a contract for employment), Sec. 3 had,
by a tortuous construction, been held applicable in Watkins v. Hudson Coal
Co., 151 F. (2d) 311 (3rd cir., 1945), cert. den. 327 U.S. 777 (1948).
In Textile Workers Union v. Alco Mfg. Co., 27 L.R.R.M. 2164,2168 (D.C.
M.D. N.C., 1950) the plaintiff union, having satisfied the relevant provisions
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, was held entitled to enforcement of an arbi-
tration award against an employer pursuant to L.M.R.A. §301, 29 U.S.C. §185,
but (unexplainedly) "not entitled to relief pursuant to the federal arbitra-
tion act."
77 The Norris-LaGuardia Act has properly had no influence on the operation
of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201. Thus in A.F.L. v. Western
Tel. Co., 179 F. (2d) 535 (6th cir., 1950), where the action was based in part
on the Declaratory judgment Act, though injunctive relief for breach of
contract also was asked, the Court of Appeals reversed dismiss4 by the
District Court and ordered the case to proceed. There was no mention of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
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ment of collective agreements being then in its infancy78 -into a field
of relations based on negotiated agreement. In 1932 the only "labor
disputes" thought of were battles of industrial warfare without agreed
rules, not battles over rules of industrial relations formulated by the
parties, not disputes over the meaning and application of promises vol-
untarily made by them. The development of no-strike clauses and
arbitration as a substitute for industrial strife"9 has occurred in the
last twenty years. Why should the Act of 1932 bar the full realization
of this development by witholding from the victims of breaches of col-
lective agreements any remedy that courts afford for preserving con-
tractual relations ?80
So far as the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to take the heat
of labor struggles off the courts by relieving them of policing functions
-and it may be doubted whether this was even a minor intention of
Congress-surely courts can always invoke the self-protecting rule
that complexity of supervision is a reason for denying specific relief
and leaving the plaintiff to recovery of damages. But the United States
courts have not thought the difficulties too great where Norris-LaGuar-
dia does not stand in the way.8' There is no gainsaying that specific
78 Fuchs, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 10 St. Louis L. Rev.
1 (1924); Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 Harv. L.
Rev. 572 (1931). The statement of purpose in §2 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act relates only to the practice of collective bargaining and does not mention
performance of agreements.
79 "The arbitration clause and the no-strike no-lockout clause in the collective
agreement are, in a very real sense, the opposite sides of the same coin.
Arbitration and economic contest are alternative ways of solving labor dis-
putes." Freidin, Legal Status of Labor Arbitration, in N.Y.U. First Annual
Conference on Labor, 234 (1948).
s0 Somewhat like the restriction on specific redress imposed by the Norris-La-
Guardia Act is the rule regarding strikers that has emerged from the N.L.R.A.
The doing of wrong (unless extremely harmful) in the course of concerted
activities, while exposing the wrong-doer to criminal and pecuniary liability,
does not subject him under the Norris-La-Guardia Act to injunction, nor
under the N.L.R.A. to permanent loss of job. Republic Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B.
107 F. (2d) 472 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1939). But if there is a material breach of col-
lective contract-at least a strike in breach of contract-the employer is not
required to deal with the contract-breaking union while the breach continues,
United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949), N.L.R.B. v. Sands- Mfg. Co., 306
U.S. 332 (1939), Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. N.L.R.B., 127 F. (2d) 109 (C.C.A.
4th, 1942), or to reemploy the contract-breaking strikers, Nat. Electric Prod.
Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 995 (1948). If such strikers are held not to be engaged
in concerted activities under N.L.R.A. §7, N.L.R.B. v. Sands Mfg. Co., at 344,
John Dyson and Sons, 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1946), should not the courts as readi-
ly hold that contract-breaking strikers are not engaged in a "labor dispute"
under the Norris-LaGuardia Act? Non-reinstatement of bad actors and con-
tact breakers is self-help very like injunctive relief, so far as the internal oper-
ation of the plant is concerned.
s'U.S. v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Cf. Dubinsky
v. Blue Dale Dress Co., 292 N.Y.S. 898, 906 (S.Ct. N.Y. Co., 1936), where
the defendant seems to have failed to invoke both the contract arbitration
clause and the anti-injunction act, N.Y. Civ. Practice Act. §876-a, already en-
acted in 1935.
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relief is a weak engine once a work stoppage has occurred. But specific
relief may prevent a work stoppage. And though it has occurred, spe-
cific relief is now part of the course prescribed by Congress to meet
"national emergencies. ' '
The paradox that we have examined could of course be easily
resolved by legislation-and has been in several states, as we have seen.
Without legislation, the courts are uncertain and uneasy.
The public need seems to me to require that specific judicial
enforcement should be available for those promises for breach of which
a money payment is patently a miserable substitute for performance,
including promises to arbitrate and to carry out arbitrators' awards-
whether such promises relate to labor relations or commercial rela-
tions.
3
Indeed collective labor agreements are rather more than ordinary
contracts; they have the nature of statutes."* Legislated through agree-
ment of the somewhat antagonistic parties bound by the necessity of
agreeing to keep the business operating-as legislators are bound to
provide appropriations and other fundamental needs to keep the gov-
ernment operating, they resemble also international treaties which are
contracts but also (when "self-executing"--or better, self-legislating)
law of the land under the "supremacy clause" of our Constitution and
like constitutional rules of many other countries. As such they are
entitled to the fullest support that the courts can give to effectuate their
fulfillment ;85 and a statute that might be construed to weaken that sup-
port, like a statute that might be construed to transgress a treaty, is
better construed so as not to enfeeble remedies protecting legal rights of
so sensitive a kind.
Whether it is Congress that has created this paradox of national
labor law by enacting too sweeping an anti-injunction act in 1932 or
82L.M.R.A. §208, 29 U.S.C. §178.
83 Comment, Arbitration of Labor Contract Interpretation Disputes, 43 Ill. L.
Rev. 678 (1948). Apart from arbitration statutes, enforcement of labor con-
tract promises to arbitrate has encountered the same common law difficulties
as that of commercial contract promises to arbitrate. Ibid. 681. Enforcement
of awards will be granted without benefit of an arbitration act. Goldstein v.
I.L.G.W.U., 238 Pa. 385, 387, 394, 196 A. 43, 44, 48 (1938, before amendment
of the Pennsylvania anti-injunction act, but without mention of it).
84The collective agreement is "the industrial constitution of the enterprise,"
N.L.R.B. v. Highland Park Mfg. Co. 110 F. (2d) 632, 638 (C.C.A. 4th, 1939) ;
it "may be likened to . . . utility schedules of rates and rules for service," J.
I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944). Cf. Chamberlain, Collective
Bargaining and the Concept of Contract, 48 Col. L. Rev. 829, 844 (1948).
85 It is but fair to note, however, that the very satisfactory performance of the
Swedish Labor Court has been achieved without its having power to imprison
for disobedience to its orders. Schmidt and Heineman, supra, note 35, at 194.
As these authors say, ibid. 199: "The real question is whether the sanctions
involved in the injunction procedure under American law are not excessively
severe. Perhaps something may be learned from the Swedish experience which
relies heavily [in breach of contract] upon the imposition of damages against
1951]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
by passing the N.L.R.A. without modifying the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to save enforcement of contracts, or whether it is the national courts
that are guilty because they have interpreted the earlier law to prevent
specific enforcement of collective contracts (even after passage of the
N.L.1.A.), somehow a reconciliation needs to be effectuated, as it has
been by state courts and legislatures, so that the collective bargaining
basis of American labor law shall have the benefit of complete support
by United States courts.
employers, unions, and employees alike, but does not make use of the ulti-
mate sanction of physical force [against the person]."
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